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The reunification of Germany has raised renewed concerns regarding 
German national identity and national security. Germany has been a pivotal point 
for some of the most momentous historical events in Europe for over a century. 
The reunification of Germany in 1990 has once again created a large and powerful 
German nation at the center of the continent. Many of the initial reactions to 
reunification have reflected deep concern and skepticism regarding the power and 
role of a united Germany. Indications of extremist violence, xenophobia, and 
increased assertiveness in foreign affairs have fueled these concerns. Behind 
many of these fears is the belief that the German "national character" is unchanged 
and could reassert itself in renewed aggressive nationalistic policies. 
This thesis examines the development of German national identity and the 
problems of national security since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
primary aspect of national identity examined is the way that Germany seeks 
security for itself. During the Cold War, the Federal Republic developed a 
national identity based on a liberal internationalism . Although reunification will 
undoubtedly create some changes, it is unlikely that Germany will deviate from its 
commitment to democratic ideals and further European integration. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The reunification of Germany has raised renewed 
concerns regarding German national identity and national 
security.  Germany has been a pivotal point for some of the 
most momentous historical events in Europe for over a 
century.  The reunification of Germany in 1990 has once 
again created a large and powerful German nation at the 
center of the continent.  Many of the initial reactions to 
reunification have reflected deep concern and skepticism 
regarding the power and role of a united Germany. 
Indications of extremist violence, xenophobia, and increased 
assertiveness in foreign affairs have fueled these concerns. 
Behind many of these fears is the belief that the German 
"national character" is unchanged and could reassert itself 
in renewed aggressive nationalistic policies. 
This thesis examines the development of German national 
identity and the problems of national security since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.  The primary aspect of 
national identity examined is the way that Germany seeks 
security for itself.  The German state was created in 1871 
largely in order to resolve their security dilemma of the 
early nineteenth century as they found themselves 
continually threatened from both the east and the west. 
Vll 
German identity therefore coalesced around anti-foreign 
sentiments and the belief that Germans must unite to create 
a bulwark against threats from all sides.  Bismarck sought 
to avoid the problems of being encircled by enemies by 
engineering a network of alliances that would make an anti- 
German war unlikely.  During the Wilhelmine Period these 
agreements were allowed to lapse and Germany found itself 
isolated and once again facing threats on two sides.  After 
World War I, Germany's political and economic isolation 
imposed by the terms of the Versailles Treaty was a chief 
contributor to the collapse of the fledgling Weimar Republic 
and the creation of Hitler's Third Reich.  During the Cold 
War, the Federal Republic integrated with the West and 
developed a national identity based on a liberal 
internationalism.  Integration meant that German security 
was guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance and that France and 
Germany became staunch allies, relieving a long-standing 
source of continental tension.  Since reunification Germany 
is in the most favorable security situation in its history, 
surrounded entirely by acknowledged friends and democratic 
states.  It is unlikely that Germany will deviate from its 
commitment to democratic ideals and further European 
integration.  Germany now has the opportunity to be a 
"normal" country, in that it has the same choices and 
responsibilities of its peers in the international system. 
vm 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the Cold War and the reunification of 
Germany, a large and powerful German nation is once again at 
the center of Europe.  This eventuality has raised renewed 
questions regarding German identity and national security 
policies for the future.  Reunification has been met with 
widespread skepticism and apprehension that a reunited 
Germany could revert to aggressive nationalistic 
expansionist policies.  What has been viewed as increased 
assertiveness in foreign affairs and incidents of extremist 
violence have fueled these concerns.  These fears seem to be 
largely based on Germany's history and the belief that the 
German "national character" is unchanging and has been 
laying dormant during the years of division. 
German national identity has been a subject of concern, 
speculation, and debate since the nineteenth century. 
Germany has been the pivotal point for some of the most 
momentous historical events in Europe for over a century. 
German unification in 1871 profoundly changed the balance of 
power in Europe and subsequently contributed to the two 
world wars in the twentieth century.  During the Cold War 
divided Germany was the focal point and the potential 
battlefield in the bipolar struggle between east and west 
with the two halves of the divided nation developing 
distinct ideological identities.  The western side developed 
an identity based on liberal-democratic ideals while the 
east had a socialist-communist regime imposed on them. 
Reunification in 1989 was not the coming together of 
homogeneous parts but the merging of these two very 
different cultures.  It would be natural for the national 
identity that the Federal Republic developed after 1949 to 
change in some fashion after the reunification of 1990. 
Such changes have occurred after previous momentous events 
in German history that impacted the Germans' perceptions of 
themselves and their role in Europe and the world. 
This thesis will examine how renewed questions of 
German national identity since 1989 affect German national 
security policy as Europe emerges from the Cold War.  The 
main facet of national identity that will be examined will 
be the way that Germany seeks security for itself.  Germany 
has pursued many options in its attempt to resolve its 
security dilemma, with varying results for Europe.  Some 
foreign policies have sought solutions through engagement 
tactics such alliance systems, European entanglements, and 
collective security.  At other times Germany has disengaged 
itself through protectionist measures, nativist policies, or 
through discussions of neutrality.  Germany has also carried 
out policies that appeared to seek engagement such as 
unilateral intervention or expansion, which in the end only 
served to isolate Germany from its neighbors. 
This study conducts a general examination of the 
emergence and changes in German national identity and 
security posture since the nineteenth century.  By virtue of 
Germany's position at the center of Europe, how Germany 
views itself and its international role and conducts its 
foreign policy has a great impact on the stability of the 
continent.  Germany, for the first time since 1914, has the 
opportunity to act and be treated like a "normal" country. 
What this means to the Germans will have far-reaching 
security consequences for us as well as them.  Undoubtedly 
the future direction of reunited Germany will define the 
course of Europe as it enters the twenty-first century. 
A.  NATIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
The French Revolution marked the beginning of a "new 
politics" based on the concept of popular sovereignty that 
swept through Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  War and revolution had disrupted not only the 
ancien  regime  but the very order of society and the people 
sought to recapture a sense of community and unity.  The 
"new politics" provided a means to organize the masses.  A 
national consciousness developed in many countries as their 
populations began to develop identities associated with the 
people   instead of  the  ruling  elites.     Although mass 
movements  were  beginning  to make  an  impact  on  elite  decision 
making,   the  common  people  actually had  little   individual 
involvement   in  the  politics  of  the  day,   v/hich were  still 
dominated by the  ruling  classes.     Over  the  course  of  the 
following  century,   however,   mass  participation was  able  to 
crystallize  public  opinion  and became  a   force  to  be 
recognized and  reckoned with by  the   ruling  elite.1 
In  the  past   two  centuries  nationalism has  become  an 
overriding   force   in  the   structure  of   international   and 
domestic  relations  of  states.     The   forces  of  nationalism 
have  taken many  forms,   making  it  difficult  to  define 
precisely as  a  concept.     Nationalism was   initially  conceived 
as  a  unifying  force which  could provide  a  sense  of  national 
pride  and unity enabling  the  people  to  liberate  themselves 
from oppression  and discrimination.      In  time,   however, 
nationalism also  showed  itself  capable  of becoming  an 
aggressive,   divisive,   destructive  force  characterized by 
intolerance,   racism,   and violence.     The manifestation  of 
nationalism in  a  particular  group  of people  depends  on  the 
There  are  several  excellent works   that  deal  with  the  complex  issue 
of  nationalism  in  general   and  German  nationalism  in  particular   including 
Peter Alter,   Nationalism,   Edward Arnold,   1985;   Liah Greenfeld, 
Nationalism,   Five Roads  to Modernity,   Harvard University Press,   1992; 
Michael  Hughes,   Nationalism and Society,   Germany 1800-1945,   Edward 
Arnold,   1988;   and George Mosse,   Nationalization  of  the Masses,   Political 
Symbolism and Mass Movements  in  Germany from  the Napoleonic  Wars  Through 
the  Third Reich,   Cornell  University Press,   1975. 
factors that promote the realization of their national 
identity.  Nationalism develops as a group of people become 
conscious of their uniqueness based on any number of common 
factors such as religion, language, race, or culture.  Any 
combination of these factors and/or other features can be 
made to form a national identity that is distinct from other 
groups.  The emphasis is on shared attitudes, common 
heritage, historical memories, and an sense of common 
objectives.  The building of a national identity is a rather 
ambiguous process of education intended to integrate diverse 
people into a cohesive social group.  But the means as well 
as the motives for the development of a national identity 
vary as widely as the characteristics that those identities 
depend on.  The establishment of a common national identity 
can provide the people with a sense of belonging that 
transcends other bonds, which in turn becomes a rationale 
for unity in and of itself.  However, in building a sense of 
national cohesion, energies are often directed outwards in 
the form of animosity and suspicion of those people who do 
not conform to the national norms.2 
The development of national identity and nationalistic 
forces can occur either with or without the framework of an 
established state.  The creation of a nation-state can be 
the result of a nationalistic movement but it is not a 
2
 Alter, Nationalism,   pp. 2-9 and 21. 
requirement of nationalism.  However, if a national identity 
becomes focused on the creation of a nation-state or the 
protection of an existing state, nationalism can become a 
political force directed against a perceived enemy that is 
seen as a threat to the nation.  These perceived threats or 
enemies can be internal or external, leading to either 
domestic or international tensions.  Carried to extremes in 
order to achieve a measure of security, nationalistic 
xenophobia can become aggressively hostile or protectively 
isolationist.  Either form can be disruptive and lead to 
open conflict in the form of revolution, civil war, or war 
against another state. 
As populations began to gain a sense of national 
identity and pride, states gradually ceased to be thought of 
as solely the property of the monarch but as an instrument 
for the advancement of broader "public" interests.  This 
fundamental change to the nature of the state also changed 
the nature of the wars that were fought in its defense.  The 
French Revolution which was fought for the establishment of 
a new national identity in France also stimulated a wide 
range of national feelings through much of Europe which in 
turn set off a flurry of conflicts throughout Europe 
culminating in the Revolutions of 1848.  Initially monarchs 
took up arms to defend the status quo and prevent the spread 
of liberal ideas.  But they were unable to stem the tide of 
national sentiment and the power that it gave to the masses. 
Peoples demands to be heard culminated in the revolutions of 
1848 which effected nearly all of Europe.  Eventually the 
monarchs were forced to come to terms with nationalism. 
When nations developed unique identities, the nature of the 
armies that fought the wars changed, as well as the support 
of the people for the armies and the wars.  As Europe 
evolved from a collection of small dynastic territories 
considered the exclusive property of a single ruler into 
nations that are an embodiment of their whole population, 
war evolved from the means to resolve disputes to the total 
mobilization of the societies' resources in order to defend 
national pride and prestige.3 War and other levels of 
conflict spurred by nationalism have been prevalent since 
the end of the 18th century and have largely been 
responsible for the changing map of Europe.  This phenomena 
is most recently demonstrated in former Yugoslavia where 
nationalist tensions have once again changed the map of 
Europe and caused the shedding of much blood.  Germany, 
obviously not the only country to engage in war-like 
nationalistic behavior, does however present an interesting 
case of a nation brought together and torn apart by 
nationalism.  Germany's legacy of war since it became a 
3
 Howard, Michael, War in European History,   Oxford University Press, 
1976, Chapter 6. 
nation-state makes it important to look at the effects of 
its continuing evolution since reunification. 
B.  THE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
In order to examine fully the impact of the evolving 
German national identity, it is first necessary to conduct a 
general examination of the emergence and changes in German 
national identity.  Only through a broad understanding of 
the development of German national identity is it possible 
to gain insight into the interrelation between national 
identity and national security. 
Ideas of a comprehensive German national identity and a 
nation of Germans came late in comparison to other European 
nationalities.  In the early nineteenth century, German 
cultural identity began to develop a political expression in 
the wake of the French Revolution, French hegemony over the 
continent, the Wars of Liberation.   As a more cohesive 
identity and desire for unity grew, ideas of what 
constituted security also changed based on nationalistic 
ideas.  German security interests would require the 
protection of a German state, rather than dependence on the 
Concert of Europe.  German unity was ultimately achieved 
through war and ideas of what was required to protect the 
new German identity and security came to be viewed by the 
end of the nineteenth century as both aggressively 
expansionist and protectionist, subsequently taking Europe 
through two devastating wars. 
The changes in German identity following World War II 
reflected the devastation of the war years, the enforced 
division of the country, and the overriding political 
reality of the ensuing bipolar conflict of the Cold War. 
During the Cold War West Germany developed a national 
identity based on a deeply rooted sense of liberal 
internationalism especially in their security and foreign 
policies.  But German action on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain was constrained by the knowledge that it was a 
divided nation and that an outbreak of Cold War tensions 
would turn Germany into a battlefield that would pit Germans 
against Germans.  The Berlin Wall symbolized not only the 
division of Germany but the east-west confrontation that 
developed into the Cold War that dominated the political 
arena during the second half of the twentieth century.  A 
divided Germany meant that German power was contained but it 
also divided the continent.  However, in spite of the 
tensions and conflicts of the Cold War, the international 
political system revolved around the inherent stability of 
bipolar competition. 
C.  THE IMPACT OF REUINFICATION 
The breaching of the Berlin Wall in 198 9 and the 
subsequent reunification of Germany has heralded the end of 
the Cold War and a new era for a united Germany as well as 
its European and Atlantic neighbors.  The euphoria of 1989 
however has now given way to uncertainty regarding the 
future.  Perhaps the most momentous and disquieting 
consequences of the end of the Cold War are the changes 
affecting Germany.  Reunification has fundamentally changed 
the image of Germany as a defeated and divided nation. 
While previous expansion of German borders have been 
conducted in a deliberate and aggressive manner, this most 
recent territorial expansion was as unexpected for most 
Germans as it was for the rest of the world.  Not 
surprisingly, Germany's sudden reunification caught its 
neighbors off guard and has caused them to reassess the 
German Question.  However, the reunification of Germany 
after nearly fifty years of existence as a divided nation 
was achieved peacefully with full knowledge and 
participation of its neighbors and partners.  Yet the 
implications of this momentous event will have far reaching 
effects on German identity and security as well as that of 
Europe.  There are elements of both change as well as 
continuity in the German national identity from its earliest 
10 
conception to the present.  Understanding these factors can 
lead to a clearer view of the future in Europe. 
The security situation in Europe has radically altered 
with the end of the Cold War and an enlarged Germany further 
exacerbates the adjustments that must be made in defining a 
new world order.  Many of the initial reactions to German 
reunification reflected deep concern and skepticism 
regarding the power and role of a united Germany and in some 
cases blatant fears of a Fourth Reich.  For the first time 
in nearly 50 years Germany once again has complete 
sovereignty and the opportunity to act more independently. 
Because of its size, economic power, and the geopolitical 
reality of being in the center of Europe, the extent to 
which Germany takes advantage of or exploits these new 
opportunities will have far reaching security implications. 
This is particularly important for the United States since 
constructive engagement on the part of the Germans depends 
fundamentally on similar American engagement. 
The seemingly recent manifestation of German 
independence has been slowly emerging since West German 
rearmament and admission to NATO.  This thesis will 
historically analyze German attitudes and trends in elite 
and popular opinion regarding their role in international 
security.  Since reunification, the principal event to be 
considered will be the recent debates and reinterpretation 
11 
of the Basic Law regarding the out-of-area issue.  The 
question of whether the German military will be permitted to 
participate in military missions other than national defense 
reflects the hopes and the fears of evolving German national 
identity. 
D.  FEATURES OF THE GERMAN "NATIONAL CHARACTER" 
Many of the current skeptics of German power seem to 
believe that the leading German role in the two world wars 
was a result of the special nature of the German people that 
will once again manifest itself now that the nation has been 
reunified.  The national character of the Germans has been a 
subject of much speculation and debate.  Throughout- the 
centuries the Germans have seemingly assumed several 
distinct personalities, fostering persistent myths about 
their character.  It was Luigi Barzini, a distinguished 
European journalist, that described the Germany as a "trompe 
l'oeil Protean country," comparing the German character to 
Proteus, the old man of the sea, who could change his 
identity at will to meet the situation at hand.  Barzini 
noted that German history, from one chapter to the next, 
seems to describe entirely different countries.  Not only do 
the borders, the name of the country, and the ideology 
differ but the very character of the people seems to 
12 
change.4 The various myths regarding German national 
identity have been perpetuated by the Germans themselves who 
seem to carry each manifestation of their character to 
extremes. 
The most persistent myths of German character revolve 
around the idea of the Germans as a militaristic and 
authoritarian people.  This stems partly from their Prussian 
heritage and partly from their acknowledged role in the two 
world wars this century.  These characteristics however 
cannot be applied to the Germans, on either side of the Iron 
Curtain, for the past five decades, although there are those 
who fear that these very traits will resurface now that the 
nation has reunited. 
Aside from its warriors and dictators, there has been 
another traditional, older, view of the Germans as thinkers 
and philosophers.  The apparent dichotomy between these two 
views of the German character has resulted in various 
analyses of the enduring features of the German national 
traits.  There have been numerous studies undertaken to 
define the German character such as those by Willy Helpach, 
S.M. Lipset, and Max Weber.  While these studies do not 
agree at every point some generalizations can be made.  The 
German work ethic is ascribed by Weber to the influence of 
Calvinist Protestantism that has persisted in spite of large 
4
 Barzini, Luigi, The Europeans,   Penguin Books, 1983, pp. 69-70. 
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Catholic and Lutheran segments of the population.5 
Systematization is the tendency toward rationality and the 
relationship between ideas and actions leading to such 
traits as thoroughness and efficiency.  There is also a 
tendency to prefer supra-individual goals, reflected in a 
idealistic commitment to society as a whole.  The rules 
following from these supra-individual goals are thought to 
apply to everyone to avoid conflict in society.  This "love 
of order" leads them to seek authoritative solutions. 
Another German trait is their sharp distinction between 
their private and public virtues.6  While these 
characteristics can certainly lead to a militaristic or 
authoritarian actions there is nothing inherent in these 
traits that suggest that those are the only possible 
outcomes.  In fact we have seen these same traits applied by 
the West Germans in the postwar years toward their economy, 
democracy, and integration. 
E.  LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE 
Barring a major, and at this time unforeseen, crisis in 
Europe, united Germany is unlikely to deviate from its 
5
 Hellpach referred to this characteristic as the "urge to work," in 
Der deutsch  Charakter,   Athanaeum, 1954. 
° For a more complete discussion of these studies done on German 
characteristics, see Dean Peabody's National   Characteristics,   Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, Chapter 8, "The Germans." 
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commitment to the promotion of European unity and long-term 
peace.  This is not to say that reunification will not 
result in further evolution of the German national identity. 
There is ample evidence that some important changes are 
occurring.  Although indications of extreme nationalistic 
ideas, xenophobia, and protectionism have prompted 
widespread concern, there is even more evidence to show that 
the German political elite and the people themselves 
advocate a stronger international community in which Germany 
takes a more active and productive role. 
If Germany is to successfully establish itself as 
leader in the post Cold War world without arousing alarm in 
its neighbors, it must come to terms with its power, 
geographic position, and its past.  Trepidation regarding 
Germany's future role is not limited to its neighbors. 
Germans themselves are anxious regarding the seeming rise in 
neo-Nazi activities, the move of the capital from Bonn to 
Berlin, and most recently the reinterpretation of the German 
constitution that allows German troops to fight in foreign 
lands.  It would seem that the old myths of a too powerful 
nationalistic and militaristic Germany are still close to 
the surface.  What image will reunited Germany develop in 
the next century?  As a new world order takes shape in the 
transition from the Cold War, the role of Germany will be 
critical.  It is necessary to confront the apprehension 
15 
regarding German power by looking at how perceptions of the 
German character developed and changed and how they have 
been tempered by the lessons of the Cold War and combined 
with new realities in order to try to understand what the 
newly emerging German power will mean to Europe and the 
world. 
16 
II.  GERMANY AS A NATION-STATE IN THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM: THE IMPACT OF UNITY UNTIL 1945 
The process of the development of a German national 
identity and the subsequent creation of a unified German 
state in the nineteenth century had a profound effect on the 
way Germans perceived themselves and their security 
situation.  The creation of a large and powerful state where 
there had once been numerous small and relatively weak 
states also fundamentally changed the balance of power in 
Europe and was viewed as a potential threat by most of the 
established states.  The skeptics of reunited German power 
look back to the years before World War II as one continuous 
policy of German striving for European hegemony.  Those 
years, however, actually consisted of four different 
political periods with their own goals and objectives for 
German foreign policy.  But to understand those periods, it 
is first necessary to take a brief look at the circumstances 
surrounding the birth of the German state. 
A.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND 
A UNIFIED GERMAN STATE 
Germany did not become a unified modern nation-state 
until 1871.  This development contrasts with France and 
England which were more or less established by the end of 
17 
the fifteenth century.7 The German state was not formed 
until over a century after the American colonists had 
created the United States. 
The idea of a German Reich as a successor to the Holy 
Roman Empire had been around for centuries.  The first 
German Reich was the medieval Holy Roman Empire, a profusion 
of diverse independent lands loosely connected to the 
authority of a central, usually German, emperor.8 The Peace 
of Westphalia, which brought the Thirty Years War to an end 
in 1648, formalized the historical fragmentation of German 
lands by recognizing over 300 sovereign German states.  The 
first serious attempt to alter this state of affairs did not 
occur until the nineteenth century when Napoleon 
consolidated these German lands into fewer than 50 states. 
The Congress of Vienna in 1815 then created the Germanic 
Confederation of 38 autonomous states.9 
The fragmentation and lack of central authority in 
Germany partially explains why a cohesive German national 
identity and liberal-democratic ideas developed so late 
there.  The crisis of the nobility and ruling elites which 
had led to the development of national identity and 
7
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revolution in England, France, and Russia did not occur in 
the German states.  The German nobility remained largely 
satisfied with the status quo because their society was more 
strictly defined, their social privileges remained intact, 
and they retained a measure of self government.  In Prussia, 
one of the larger German states from 1700 on, absolutism 
grew strong and essentially unopposed by the nobility, in 
return for having their rights in regards to the peasants 
firmly enforced.10 
German nationalism first arose mainly among middle- 
class professionals and intellectuals in the late 
eighteenth.  These educated commoners thought of themselves 
as a natural elite, but were denied commensurate social 
status because of the rigidity of Germany's quasi-feudal 
social structure.  The ideas of nationalism ignited by the 
French Revolution appeared to them as a means of instilling 
their position as valued members of a national collectivity. 
Even though they were a small and relatively powerless 
group, they had far-reaching impact because of their 
influence in the press and the classrooms.11 
The crises that spurred widespread German nationalism 
were the Wars of Liberation from Napoleonic domination in 
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1812.12 These conflicts not only provided a fresh impetus 
for German nationalism but the first occasion when German 
nationality formed expression in military action.  Many 
others would follow on in the next century and a half.13 
During the decade of peace that followed the defeat of 
Napoleon, further means of expressing their nascent German 
national cohesiveness were a matter of intense and bitter 
debate.  One view was that a strong centralized State was 
necessary to protect the Germans from the French.14 More 
widespread were a variety of less statist alternatives 
generally associated with liberalism, at this time a loose 
association of beliefs rather than a political movement. 
Liberalism of this sort was particularly common among 
members of the middle and upper classes who differed widely 
in their backgrounds, status, and interests.  Liberalism 
accordingly stood for a complex of diverse, often very 
generalized opinions and attitudes including a wish for 
national unity, the replacement of bureaucratic absolutism 
by political systems that allowed wider participation in 





 Craig, The  Germans,   p. 32, 
13
 Greenfeld, Nationalism,   Five Roads  to Modernity,   p. 3 60.  Liah 
Greenfeld has argued that it was owing to the Wars of Liberation that 
German nationalism became the most "activist, violent, and xenophobic 
species of the phenomena."  She does not however acknowledge that German 
actions were in defense of the 'activist, violent, and xenophobic' wars 
of nationalistic domination launched by the French. 
14
 Craig, The  Germans,   p. 32. 
20 
that inhibited a free social and economic life, the lifting 
of press censorship, the partial or total separation of 
church and state, an independent judiciary, and improvements 
in public education.15 The liberal program of nineteenth 
century Germans sought a constitutional government which 
would distribute rights and responsibilities to a wider 
range of educated and self-reliant citizens.16  For most 
German intellectuals the goal of national unity and the 
ideas of liberalism were inseparable.  The German liberals 
were unable to coalesce as a cohesive political movement and 
therefore mobilize wide public support.  Eventually they 
were forced to abandon many of their ideals for reform in 
order to achieve national unity.17 
It was Prussia, under the able leadership of Otto von 
Bismarck, that finally achieved German unity and coopting 
German liberalism.  Until the 1860s, Prussia was an unlikely 
candidate for this role.  Prussia was among the most 
conservative states in Europe and made no pretensions of 
conducting an independent foreign policy, preferring to 
defer primarily to Austria, but also to Russia whenever 
15
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possible.18 Austria was the unquestionably preeminent state 
in Germany.  But Austria, facing conflicts within its 
empire, sought to prevent revolution and actively opposed 
liberal ideals and German unity.  Although Prussia had 
nominally become a constitutional state in the aftermath of 
the revolutions of 1848, it maintained its autocratic 
character and began to take advantage of Austria's internal 
preoccupation in order to consolidate its own power.19 
This, in the end, was a military problem to which the 
Prussian army provided the ultimate solution. 
Bismarck made German unity a reality through military 
and diplomatic means.  He believed that it was Prussia's 
destiny to take the lead in German affairs even if it meant 
going against Austria.  The opening salvo in the Prussian 
push toward German unification was the brief war waged by 
Denmark against Prussia and Austria over the provinces of 
Schleswig and Holstein.  This conflict, fought for 
putatively "national" objectives helped lessen liberal 
opposition to military reform by enflaming patriotic pride. 
Although Prussia and Austria had been allies during the 
Danish war, disagreements arose regarding the final 
disposition of Schleswig and Holstein.  These disagreements 
led to war between Prussian and Austria in 1866, culminating 
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in the decisive defeat of Austria at Königgrätz in 1866. 
The Prussian victory not only excluded Austria from future 
German affairs but also resulted in the organization of a 
new confederation of 22 northern German states under 
Prussian leadership.20 
Further German unity was opposed both by the French and 
a majority of the governments of the southern German states 
although many of the people still hoped for unity.  However, 
when France declared war on Prussia in 1870, the southern 
states mobilized on the side of Prussia.  The combined 
German armies not only outnumbered the French but were 
superior in organization and logistics.  The French were 
quickly defeated.  In the wake of this overwhelming German 
military victory Bismarck concluded his diplomatic victory 
by achieving German unity by establishing a new German 
empire under the King of Prussia.21 
B.  THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS:  BISMARCK'S SYSTEM OF 
STATES 
The Franco-Prussian War completed the process of German 
unification. It also reorganized the European states system 
in ways that would place substantial burdens on the new 
20
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German state.  The Treaty of Frankfurt of May 1371 concluded 
the peace between France and Germany but with harsh terms of 
reparation and the loss of the territories of Alsace and 
Lorraine that would preclude any lasting reconciliation 
betv/een the two states.22 To some extent Bismarck had 
anticipated the destabilizing effect of a large Germany.  He 
understood that German security was a fragile entity and 
that the existence of a united Germany would be perceived as 
a threat to the security of its European neighbors.  To help 
stabilize Europe and allow the fledgling German state time 
to consolidate, Bismarck engineered a complex network of 
alliances that made war in Europe unlikely. 
The forces that drove the great powers of Europe in the 
late nineteenth century had become increasingly complex. 
Although Germany was a new entity, its location, size, 
economic potential, and military might immediately made it a 
continental power with significant influence.  Imperialism 
was a prime determining factor in foreign policy.  France 
and England focused their attention on the acquisition and 
maintenance of their overseas colonies.  Germany, Russia, 
and Austria-Hungary, as continental imperialists, all vied 
for influence in the same narrow geography of Central 
Europe.  Tensions were inevitable as territories were 
liberated by the crumbling Ottoman Empire.  Although the 
22
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Congress of Berlin in 1878 attempted to settle territorial 
questions in the Balkans and Africa, the final agreement was 
not truly acceptable to any of the participants.23  The tug 
of war for advantage over rivals and even allies encouraged 
revanchist attempts to regain lost territories. 
Economic considerations became more important as money, 
international finance, and trade became political weapons.24 
Free trade suffered as countries became more protectionist, 
prompting tariff wars and aggressive economic policies.25 
German unification was followed by the Great Depression of 
1873 to 1896.  Germany's successes in industry and 
manufacturing had created a great faith in German economic 
abilities and liberal ideals.  But once the depression was 
underway, this confidence eroded and disillusionment set in 
against individualism and materialism, basic concepts of 
liberalism.  Agriculture was also affected, as cheap imports 
threatened land owners who pressured the government to take 
protectionist measures.  Disillusionment and political 
instability resulted in the eclipse of the very German 
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liberalism that had contributed so much to the creation of 
the German state.26 
Germany was acutely aware of its status as a relative 
newcomer and also as the central, "balancing" power of the 
system.  Austria-Hungary was a troubled empire, preoccupied 
with preventing the effects of the crumbling Ottoman Empire 
from spreading to its empire.  Russia was loathe to 
acknowledge anything but complete victory in negotiations 
and considered any concession a loss of prestige.  France 
deeply felt the humiliation of their defeat in the Franco- 
Prussian war and was determined to take revenge on united 
Germany.27  England was fully absorbed by its own vast 
colonial empire, but kept a watchful eye on the machinations 
of the continental powers. 
As national identities had coalesced across Europe, 
nationalism began to develop as a powerful force in 
international relations, which was now increasingly subject 
to the vagaries of public opinion.  Ideas of national 
identity also acquired more militant and anti-foreign 
overtones.  The French focused their attention primarily 
against the Germans due to their lost pride and territories 
and their fear of the German military might.  Pan-Germanism 
26
 Hughes, Nationalism and Society,   Germany 1800-1945,   pp. 131-132. 
Kennan, George F., The Decline  of Bismarck's  European  Order, 
Franco-Russian Relations,   1875-1890,   Princeton University Press, 1979, 
pp. 7 and 33-37. 
26 
and pan-Slavism became mass movements, and their ideologies 
found greater institutional expression.  Not only were a 
broader range of people being included in politics, but many 
of the elite began to be influence by the nationalist 
fervor.  Governments did little to stem the nationalist 
tide, partly because they did not recognize its power, but 
also because the strong anti-foreign rhetoric served to 
deflect attention from their own failures.  Even so, 
nationalism was a shifting force and created internal 
problems as well as distorting external relations, notably 
within the multicultural empires of Russia and Austria- 
Hungary.28 
The tensions between the powers constantly threatened 
to erupt into war.  There were numerous proxy wars and 
limited conflicts outside Europe in the first two decades of 
the Second German Empire.  Each nation was protective of its 
own interests while seeking to contain and isolate its 
rivals.  Yet continental Europe, despite the tension and 
divisive tendencies managed to enjoy a period of relative 
peace, progress, and prosperity.29 
This peaceful state was due to a great extent to the 
system of states engineered by Bismarck, whose fundamental 
28
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principle was to ensure that Germany was allied to at least 
two of the five major powers.  As early as 1873 Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and Russia had established the Three 
Emperor's League, which called for mutual consultation on 
important international issues but did not provide any 
guarantees of security.  With the conclusion of the Dual 
Alliance in 1879, Germany's first and staunchest ally became 
Austria-Hungary.  This treaty provided mutual security and 
furthermore encouraged the Russians to strengthen their ties 
with Germany.  The Three Emperor's League was thereupon 
renewed and strengthened in 1881.  While it did not 
guarantee security it provided for neutrality in the event 
of war with a fourth power.  In 1882 Germany, Austria, and 
Italy entered into the Triple Alliance.30 
The aggregate effect of these agreements was to isolate 
France, thus providing the essential security that Germany 
sought.31  England too was considered a desirable ally for 
Germany, but the English did not respond to German 
overtures, preferring to focus on their colonial empire. 
Relations between Austria and Russia were increasingly 
strained and undermined efforts to build a solid alliance. 
Moreover since many provisions of the treaties were done 
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secretly there was a large measure of distrust and suspicion 
on all sides. 
As tensions between the European powers continued to 
mount, it became increasingly difficult for Bismarck to 
maintain an advantageous alliance system.  The possibility 
of preventive war was debated within the government.  As 
early as 1875, when army chief of staff Helmuth von Moltke 
advocated war with France, a move that, at the time, would 
have enjoyed some public support.32 A more fatalistic view 
of Europe's future began to emerge in which war with Russia 
was considered an inevitable, and even desirable, means of 
resolving deepening pan-German and pan-Slav hostilities. 
Bismarck was able to prevent these attitudes from becoming 
reality.  To him, war was a statesman's ultimate weapon, not 
to be taken lightly.33  He did not believe a war with Russia 
could result in gains that would exceed German losses. 
Those who argued for a preemptive war did not understand 
that war in the industrialized age had become a senseless, 
self-destructive undertaking, no longer suitable as a 
political weapon.  The romantic ideas of war as a test of 
manhood, courage, and patriotism had not yet been tested by 
32
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the new forms of butchery that modern technology had devised 
for the battlefield.34 
Bismarck's system of alliances was doomed to fail as a 
new generation of monarchs came to power, first in Russia 
them in Germany.  Tsar Alexander III became the new Russian 
ruler in 1881.  Although he was very conservative, he was 
sympathetic to the pan-Slav movement and more interested in 
the Balkans.  He was suspicious of the Austro-Hungarians and 
tended to be anti-German.35  But it was Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
who took the German throne in 1888, who allowed the fragile 
system of alliances to lapse completely by forcing 
Bismarck's retirement in 1890. 
C.  THE WILHELMINE PERIOD 
The transition from Bismarck's system to that of 
Wilhelm is commonly dated from Germany's failure to renew 
the so-called "Reinsurance Treaty," a secret agreement 
between Russia and Germany originally concluded in 1887, to 
last initially for five years.  This treaty had been 
Bismarck's final attempt to keep Russia away from France, 
while maintaining a semblance of harmony between Russia and 
Austria-Hungary in the east.  The decision to allow it to 
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lapse signaled the arrival of a new, more assertive and 
"national" approach to foreign affairs in Berlin.  Wilhelm 
had especially disliked Bismarck's even-handed policy toward 
Russia, and wished to move closer to Austria instead.  The 
results quickly became evident in the Franco-Russian Treaty 
of 1894, after which Germany had little alternative but to 
stick by its Austrian partner and its even weaker and much 
less reliable ally, Italy.36 
That this was a position tantamount to isolation is 
evident in retrospect.  But its effects were not immediately 
recognized at the time.   After having become accustomed to 
German success for such a long period of time, natural pride 
had turned somewhat arrogant and Bismarck's successors felt 
that his painstaking measures to maintain that success were 
no longer needed.37 There were indeed ample reasons for 
German pride and confidence in its powers.  In the two 
decades before World War I, Germany enjoyed considerable 
economic, scientific, and intellectual growth38 along with 
its continued military prowess. 
The style most often attributed to the Wilhelmine 
period is one of "garish display and vulgar ostentation."39 
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This extended to Germany's dealings in foreign affairs.  The 
Kaiser not only abandoned Bismarck's system of alliances but 
changed the focus of German foreign policy to the attainment 
of world power rather than the maintenance of a continental 
balance favorable to Germany.40  This desire for world power 
manifested itself through military growth and the attainment 
of an overseas empire.41  Germany looked to England to fill 
the gap created by its loss of the Russian connection, and 
in the 1890s there had been a real possibility for an Anglo- 
German entente.  However, the British were alienated by 
Germany's naval build up and aggressive activities in 
colonial affairs.  By 1907, Britain had moved firmly into 
the Franco-Russian camp.42 
In the end it is Germany's indispensable link to 
Austria that created the conditions that finally allowed a 
Balkan crisis to produce a world war.  The crisis of 1914 
was allowed to develop in hopes of enhancing Austria- 
Hungary's status as a Great Power, based on a regional 
victory in the Balkans. Although Germany was in no position 
to conduct an all-out war, it depended on the other powers 
39
 Ibid, p. 258. 
40
 Hillgruber, Germany and  the  Two  World Wars,   p. 1. 
41
 Craig, Europe  Since  1815,   p. 258. 
42
 Hillgruber, Germany and  the   Two  World Wars,   p. 9.  Gordon Craig 
also notes the effect of the realignment of European powers in From 
Bismarck  to Adenauer:  Aspects  of German  Statecraft,   he quotes 
Maximillian Harden in 1906 as saying that "When Bismarck departed, 
France was isolated; when Holstein went, Germany was." 
32 
also being adverse to a general war and restraining 
Russia.43  But once the hostilities had begun Germany found 
it was unable to contain the crisis because of the rigidity 
of German war plans44 and because its Austro-Hungarian ally 
could not be induced to break off its attack on Serbia.  The 
decision for war could not be understood from an economic 
standpoint since the unavoidable losses would exceed any 
expected gains.  The resolve for war came about as the 
result of Germany's concern, shared by the other powers, 
with prestige, political imperialistic objectives in the 
Balkans, the inability to back away from the conflict, and 
nationalistic rivalries.45 
Once the war was underway, it became apparent that 
implementation of the Schlieffen Plan had failed to bring 
war to a swift conclusion.46 There were two views on the 
goals of the war in Germany.  The chancellor, Theobald von 
43
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Bethmann-Holweg, believed that if Germany could successfully 
defend itself against the Triple Entente then it would have 
demonstrated its great power status.  Opposing this status 
quo objective was General Erich von Ludendorff who felt that 
Germany's future depended not only on winning the war but by 
greatly expanding German territory and power.  Ludendorff's 
views received stronger support by public opinion and 
particularly coincided with the goals of the Pan-German 
League which sought to push Russia back to the borders of 
Peter the Great and build a great German empire at the 
expense of the Slavs.  Their idea was to control and 
economically exploit central Europe and reduce Russia to a 
state of German dependency.47 
All countries had entered the war with the belief that 
the war was justified by liberal ideals.  Even in Germany 
and Austria there was a liberal element to their goals since 
they believed they were preventing further Russian 
expansion.48  But as the war proceeded all the countries 
suffered a decline of liberal attitudes and increased 
political centralization.49 
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After the Russian revolution in 1917, Russia sued for a 
separate peace with Germany and it seemed as if the Germans 
had succeeded in their efforts to make the Russians 
subservient.50 The seemingly sudden collapse of the German 
government and surrender to the allies came as a shock to 
the majority of the German population.51  Instead of 
defeating the German nationalist forces, the ending of the 
war and the peace that followed encouraged a more virulent 
form of nationalism to flourish.  Although democracy was 
imposed on Germany and the League of Nations was established 
to resolve disputes between all nations through arbitration 
and sanctions, the allied victory would prove to be a 
fleeting and incomplete liberal success. 
D.  THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC:  THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY 
In the chaos that followed World War I, no clear system 
of states emerged that could maintain peace and govern the 
interaction of nations.  The liberal ideas that had provided 
so much hope before the end of the war had not survived the 
peace negotiations.  The ideal of self-determination 
succumbed to what appeared to be the old system of balance 
of power that redistributed territories of the vanquished to 
the victors with little consideration  for self- 
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determination or even civil liberties.52  The conservative 
dynasties of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia had fallen 
and a new map of Europe was drawn up as territories were 
redistributed and independence granted to many of the 
disputed areas of central and eastern Europe. 
The isolation of Weimar Germany was set in motion by 
the peace settlement of the Treaty of Versailles.  The 
French especially took the opportunity to exact revenge for 
their treatment at the hands of the Germans after the 
Franco-Prussian War.  Germany had not only claimed Alsace- 
Lorraine and imposed heavy indemnities but had humiliated 
the defeated French by proclaiming the Second German Reich 
at the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles.53  The peace 
conference to end World War I was also held in Versailles 
where the French demanded and received the rich German 
Saarland as well as Alsace-Lorraine, substantial 
reparations, and the humiliation of the Germans by forcing 
them to accept complete war guilt and curtailed sovereignty. 
The victors hoped to preserve peace by ensuring that Germany 
was too weak to rise again. 
The violence and destruction of World War I had shocked 
Europe and most of the survivors wanted nothing more than 
52
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peace to rebuild their lives. The old order was replaced 
with new, untried forms of government: communism in Russia 
and eastern Europe, and democracy in Germany.  Governments 
focused on domestic issues and rebuilding political and 
economic institutions.  Liberal thinkers hoped that the 
establishment of the League of Nations would create a new 
world order based on collective security and general 
disarmament.54  But, the 1920s and 1930s would be years of 
continuous crises that tested and eventually defeated hopes 
for a new era of peace. 
Although all the European governments were shaken to 
some degree by the political and economic upheaval following 
World War I, for Germany it would mean the failure of the 
short-lived democratic experiment.  The German republic had 
been declared on November 9, 1918 as a result of worker 
revolution and the abdication of the Kaiser.  The change was 
widely welcomed by the German people who had become 
completely disillusioned by the rigid hierarchy of the 
monarchy that had produced such a disastrous war.  But 
Germany faced continual challenges both in its foreign 
affairs and domestically that prevented democracy from 
firmly taking root.  The new German constitution bore the 
seeds of its own destruction by attempting to implement the 
highest ideals of the democratic method.  Although the 
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proportional representation mandated by the constitution was 
the best way to represent all opinions, there was such a 
broad spectrum of opinions that it created a profusion of 
parties making a coalition government inevitable.  The 
political environment was highly volatile and not conducive 
to the stabilization of the new government.  To compound the 
problem of maintaining a stable government, the new 
constitution provided the President with extensive powers 
including the right to suspend the constitution in times of 
emergency.55 
German statesman of the Weimar period were unequal to 
the task of building stability for Germany.  Walter Rathenau 
and Gustav Steersmann both recognized the importance of 
accepting the burdens of the peace settlement and that the 
critical problems that Germany faced could best be resolved 
by engaging Germany in European affairs.  They sought to 
build confidence in Germany's intentions in order to relieve 
the burden of the Versailles Treaty and regain political and 
economic freedom.56  But politics of moderation and 
integration met with resistance in the German Republic.  The 
harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the crises they 
created gave rise to radical opposition ranging from ardent 
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communists on the left to supernationalist patriots on the 
right.  Efforts by the government to meet the terms of the 
Treaty of Versailles were viewed as treasonous, particularly 
by right wing nationalist extremists, who persisted in 
believing that Germany's surrender had been a product of 
weak civilians rather than defeat of its armies.57 
Economics of the interwar years took on an added 
importance throughout Europe because of the world financial 
crisis from 1929 into the 1930s.  The economic integration 
that Europe had enjoyed before World War I was not re- 
established after the war.  Governments turned inward as 
their populations grew more desperate.  Because of their 
heavy war indemnities and the loss of the Saarland, Germany 
was especially hard-hit by economic difficulties.58 After 
too brief a period of economic and intellectual growth 
during the late 1920s, the Depression was a strain on all 
democratic institutions.  Germany, already politically 
unstable and with public opinion fractured succumbed to 
extremist pressures of the right.59 
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E.  THE NAZI ERA 
Although the world economic crisis had facilitated 
Hitler's rapid rise to power, he was not essentially 
concerned with economic or domestic issues.  He rejected 
economic ties that might result in political dependence, and 
focused on a more ambitious program for world dominance. The 
economic improvements he made were chiefly in the kinds of 
heavy industry necessary for war.60  Hitler thus capitalized 
on Germany's isolation as well as flagging international 
support for the terms of the peace treaty.  As Hitler became 
more aggressively revisionist, the western nations stood 
idly by since the harsh terms of the Versailles treaty made 
the German territorial claims seem somewhat justified 
loosely based upon self determination.61  By a policy of 
appeasement the west sought to correct the wrongs of the 
treaty and integrate Germany in part, perhaps out of concern 
for the simultaneous threats by Russia and an increasingly 
assertive Japan. 
The tension between capitalist nations and communist 
Russia shaped the European and global alignment of powers in 
the interwar years.  With the restraining traditional 
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balance of power wiped away, the ideas of nationalism, 
communism, socialism, revanchism, expansionism, and racism 
emerged in new more virulent forms and found fertile grounds 
in the instability of the interwar years.  As extremists 
found their voice and developed mass movements, the battle 
lines were drawn between communism and national socialism, 
Russia and Germany, Stalin and Hitler.  As communism became 
established in Russia, the extreme right reacted to it by 
adopting equally revolutionary means -- mass movements, 
racism, and elimination of ones enemies — to counter the 
threat.   As the centrists quarreled and divided into 
factions, parties of the extremes took advantage of the 
confusion to gain power. 
Hitler's National Socialist program was carefully 
engineered to gain public support and create a far-reaching 
mass movement.62  He appealed to the popular ideas of the 
time by exploiting fears of the Slavs and communists and 
linking his national socialist party to the pan-German 
movement which already had a broad base of support in 
Germany.  The pan-Germans anticipated many of the basic 
tenets of Nazism: racial superiority, mission to rule the 
world, contempt for law and international treaties, the 
belief of might over right, and a fear of being surrounded 
°2 Laqueur, Russia  and Germany,  A Century of Conflict,   p. 304, 
41 
by enemies.  The destruction of Russia and the Slavs was the 
cornerstone of Hitler's plan to build a pan-German empire.63 
Fascism was everywhere a nationalist movement but 
Hitler's version incorporated a unique and deadly racism 
primarily aimed at the Jews, but also Slavs and any other 
"inferior" race.  Jews were the scapegoats for all the ills 
of Europe; they were considered at once the agents of 
capitalism, socialism, liberalism, and communism; whatever 
was undermining the existing order.64 
As diametrically opposed as communism and national 
socialism were on the political scale, their roots are 
remarkably similar and their politics became mirror images 
of one another.  While their aims were very different, their 
methods were frequently similar and it is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish between the two.  Both had emerged 
from the rubble of World War I and espoused totalitarianism 
as a necessity for growth and progress.  Both used the power 
of propaganda to garner popular support.  Although both 
communism and fascism were genuine mass movements, it was 
the leaders not the masses that shaped the policies and 
ultimately the outcomes.65 
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Hitler had said that "Germany will be a world power, or 
there will be no Germany."66 And indeed, he nearly 
destroyed Germany, and Europe too, in order to fulfill his 
promise. 
World War II brought to an end 74 years of German 
unity.  Hitler's legacy would taint that entire period and 
create a burden of history that has been slow to ease.  Yet 
the first four decades were years of relative peace and 
prosperity for all of Europe, largely attributable to the 
policies of Bismarck who sought to mitigate the disruptive 
consequences that unifying Germany had caused.  His system 
of alliances succeeded in tying Germany to other European 
powers.  The divisive forces that destroyed his system after 
his forced retirement were not entirely of Germany's making. 
German foreign policies very much reflected those of the 
other European powers:  colonial power, status and influence 
on the continent, protectionism, and of course nationalism. 
But Germany's central location made it both more vulnerable 
more threatening.  By 1914, all of Europe was primed for war 
and the Balkan crises provided the spark.  During the Weimar 
years after World War II, German efforts to once again 
establish firm ties with Europe were met with resistance 
from both their vengeful neighbors and own revisionist 
citizens.  Germany had never been so vulnerable and alone. 
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Its untenable security situation coupled with a v/eak 
democratic system contributed to the emergence of Hitler's 
extremist regime.  Nevertheless, Germany was not alone in 
seeking extreme political solutions to the difficult 
interwar years, communism and fascism threatened the entire 
continent.  In the end Germany was once again divided and 
provided a buffer zone in the center of Europe. 
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III.  THE GERMANYS DURING THE COLD WAR 
The ending of World War II created an entirely new 
situation in Europe.  Germany was once again a fragmented 
nation but not one that resembled anything from the past. 
Its new borders had been arbitrarily drawn to facilitate the 
administration and reeducation of the Germans by the allies. 
The long-term political division of Germany had not been an 
intended consequence of the victors, but grew out of the 
tensions that developed between communist Soviet Union and 
the western democracies.  The bipolar conflict that 
dominated the Cold War centered on divided Germany, 
symbolized after 1961 by the Berlin Wall.  The geographic 
and ideological division of Europe created a new dimension 
of security problems and solutions.  The clear-cut blocs 
that formed on either side of the Iron Curtain in no way 
resembled the shifting alliances of the past.  The 
traditional German security dilemma was overtaken by the 
Cold War tensions that threatened to turn Germany into a 
battlefield with Germans on both sides of the confrontation. 
As the Cold War deepened both sides began to accept the 
status quo and ideas of the reunification of Germany faded. 
German security and identity were defined by the long-term 
division of the country and ideological battle between east 
and west. 
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A.  THE DIVISION OF GERMANY: ZONES OF OCCUPATION 
The Alliance between the United Kingdom, the Soviet 
Union and the United States was held together by their 
common desire to defeat Hitler's Nazi Germany.  Although 
their immediate goals coincided, there was little agreement 
on the disposition of Germany after the war.  A series of 
conferences were held before the end of the war in order to 
reach some common understanding about the peace.  The 
Teheran Conference at the end of 1943 was the first joint 
meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. They agreed 
on the establishment of a new world organization to promote 
peaceful solutions to international problems.67 Stalin 
advocated the division of Germany into several states as a 
means of preventing the resurgence of German nationalism, 
but no agreements were reached.68 The London Protocol of 
September 1944 first suggested a proposition that the three 
powers to create zones of occupation within the German 
boundaries of 1937.  The Yalta conference in February 1945 
solidified the agreement on the occupation zones and the 
status of Berlin.  However, the status of the German-Polish 
border was deferred because Russia was unwilling to 
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surrender Polish territories it had gained.69 Questions on 
political, military and administrative issues remained 
unresolved until the end of the war. 
Under the relentless onslaught of the Allied Forces, 
the Axis Powers faced defeat in the spring of 1945.  The 
final collapse came quickly.  When he finally realized the 
hopelessness of the situation, Hitler committed suicide in 
his bunker in Berlin on April 30, 1945.  Three days later 
the Russians overran Berlin.  The unconditional surrender of 
Germany followed on May 7, 1945.70 
Following World War II, Europe remained in a state of 
chaos.  The leaders were determined to avoid the errors of 
the past that had led to two devastating wars within twenty- 
five years.  Unlike the ending of World War I, there was no 
doubt in the minds of the German people that they were a 
defeated nation.  There was no general peace treaty to 
conclude the war.  Instead, arrangements were made by 
piecemeal negotiations that gave a sense of impermanence to 
the arrangements.  Indeed, many of the arrangements were 
intended to be temporary.71  In June 1945, the Berlin 
Declaration granted administrative authority to the three 
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powers plus France, with oversight by an allied central 
commission.  The Potsdam Conference later that summer 
highlighted the growing conflicts between the western powers 
and the Soviet Union.  The Russians insisted that Poland be 
granted lands as far west as the Oder-Neisse line which 
included a large portion of Prussia.  An enclave surrounding 
Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia was ceded directly 
to the Soviet Union.  Since Soviet troops occupied the 
entire eastern part of Germany and had borne the brunt of 
the ground war, the western allies felt compelled to accede 
to Russian pressures although a final determination was 
deferred indefinitely until a peace settlement was 
concluded.  As devastating to Germany as the partition and 
loss of territory was the determination to relocate Germans 
from eastern Germany involving more than eleven million 
people with devastating social and economic consequences for 
Germany.72 
The victors had intended for the partitioning of 
Germany to be a temporary measure only until the allies had 
demilitarized and reeducate the German people.  Once they 
were rehabilitated, German sovereignty would be restored. 
But Soviet policies made cooperation between the zones 
problematic and seemed designed to prolong German hardship 
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and thereby promote communism.73 The Russian zone of 
occupation became a dividing line between the Soviet Union 
and the western allies and disagreements regarding Germany's 
future deepened ideological differences and mistrust. 
Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the western 
allies deteriorated over both political and economic issues. 
Local elections held in 1946 showed that the people in the 
Russian zone voted predominantly for socialist-communist 
parties while those in the western zones favored democratic 
parties.  But it was disagreements regarding economic issues 
that ended any-pretense of cooperation.  Although Germany 
was supposed to be treated as a single economic unit, the 
Soviets continued to demand harsh reparations while the 
western allies tried to make Germany economically viable as 
soon as possible.  In 1947 the British, French and American 
zones were combined into a single unit and Allied-Soviet 
cooperation degenerated into the Cold War.74 
B.  TWO GERMAN STATES: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
DIVISION 
In 1949, the three western zones of occupation became 
the Federal Republic of Germany while the Soviets 
established the German Democratic Republic in their eastern 
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zone under communist control.  The forces of nationalism 
that had been so predominant after World War I became 
crushed under the ideological confrontation of east and 
west.  Yet the decision to create separate German states was 
not made lightly.  German unity remained the ultimate 
objective for the western allies and the Russians, as well 
as the German people although for very different reasons. 
The west viewed a united Germany as a bulwark against 
further Soviet expansion while the Russians hoped to exploit 
Germany economically and eventually assume political 
control.75 Germany was considered a valuable resource and 
its strategic position made it impossible for either side to 
allow the other to gain control or to permit Germany to find 
its own way.76 
The Germans hoped to retain some measure of their 
identity.  The devastation of the war and the reality of the 
Nazi experience had shaken German confidence.  It was not 
allied efforts of "reeducation" that discredited forever the 
Nazi ideology, but the Germans' own experiences of total 
defeat and the chaos left in the wake of Hitler's 
domination.  When the western allies decided to fuse their 
zones into a west German government in order to promote 
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further economic recovery, many Germans feared that this 
action would divide the nation as well as create a rift in 
the western zones if some Germans turned toward Soviet 
solutions for reunification.  Therefore the western Germans 
were careful to create a government that would provide a 
provisional arrangement until the country was reunited. 
Instead of a constitution they drafted a Basic Law under 
liberal democratic principles.  The drafters of the new 
document sought to correct some of the constitutional flaws 
that had facilitated the Weimar Republic's downfall.  Much 
of the government's powers were decentralized to the Länder 
and the President's powers were curtailed.  Their voting 
procedures were a mixture of proportional and direct 
representation in order to ensure a broad spectrum of the 
public would be heard in the government but at the same time 
discourage a proliferation of small extremist parties.  A 
Constitutional Court was also established that had the power 
to determine the constitutionality of government actions and 
ban any political parties considered anti-democratic.77 
Elections were held in August 1949.  Konrad Adenauer of 
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was named as the 
Chancellor.  His long political career dated from 1906, 
although his experience had been principally limited to 
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municipal administration, he had gained some national 
experience during the Weimar Republic.  He had been 
dismissed from his post as Lord Mayor of Cologne by the 
Nazis in 1933.  His experience and his talents gave him the 
qualities needed to lead West Germany to political and 
economic recovery.78 Adenauer's Westpolitik espoused 
liberal-democratic ideals of full cooperation and 
integration with the west.  He supported the development of 
multinational institutions that would firmly tie Germany to 
the other western nations.  He hoped that German cooperation 
would build the confidence in German intentions in order to 
regain its sovereignty.79 
Although Adenauer's policies were generally popular 
with the German public, his stance on relations with Russia 
and East Germany seemed to conflict with desires for speedy 
reunification.  Ideology won out over nationalistic 
sentiments when Adenauer rejected Stalin's offer in 1952 of 
a unified but neutral Germany in favor of democracy and 
unity with the West.  In reality, it was unclear whether 
Stalin's offer was genuine or primarily an effort to retard 
West Germany's military integration into NATO by exploiting 
the public's aversion to rearmament and desire for 
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reunification.  Adenauer's refusal did not mean that German 
unification was unimportant to him but his focus was 
primarily on economic recovery, integration with the west, 
and anti-communism.  He hoped to achieve national unity 
through a policy of strength by aligning with the west and 
particularly with the United States and its nuclear weapons, 
thinking the Soviet Union must relent in the face of a 
united front.  Adenauer staunchly considered the Federal 
Republic the only legitimate German state and the December 
31, 1937 borders as the frontiers of Germany as a whole.  He 
not only denied recognition to East Germany as a state but 
refused to normalize relations with countries that did 
recognize the GDR.80 
The loss of the eastern land meant that West Germany 
was in the most precarious security position since German 
unification in 1871.  The new geography produced by 
Germany's division meant that the front line of the Cold War 
rivalry ran through German territories.  West Germany was 
now a narrow country whose population was concentrated near 
its eastern border.  This situation presented a security 
problem not only for the Germans but for all of Europe. 
Since Germany had been disarmed and had been forbidden to 
raise an army, the security of Germany rested with the 
occupying forces.  And since Germany had twice led Europe to 
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war by attempting to resolve its security dilemma, it was 
imperative that German security be assured.  The division of 
Germany added a potentially explosive revisionist dimension 
to post-war problems, reminiscent of those after the First 
World War.81  German rearmament was a controversial issue, 
both at the international and the domestic levels. 
Germany's European neighbors were understandably hesitant to 
allow the resurrection of a German army.  And a large 
portion of the German population felt that rearmament would 
be a mistake and wished to renounce arms forever.  But 
deepening of the Cold War tensions and particularly the 
Korean War led the west to the realization that German 
rearmament would be crucial to the security of Europe. 
In 1955, Germany began to rearmed as a full member of 
NATO and its sovereignty was restored.  Ten years after the 
end of the war, occupation of West Germany was ended 
although the allies retained special emergency powers.82 
Germany also voluntarily placed some unique restrictions on 
their sovereignty by unilaterally forswearing the production 
of nuclear weapons and pledging to never use force to 
achieve unification.83 Membership in NATO provided the 
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ideal solution to West Germany's security dilemma.  It 
provided a formidable security guarantee and also restrained 
German military aggressiveness.84 The new German army, the 
Bundeswehr, was completely recreated by a liberal-democratic 
state.  The new force was one of "citizen in uniform" with a 
constitutionally narrow mission, under full control by 
civilian government.85 Germany's militaristic tradition had 
been laid to rest.  Although there was little in the way of 
a democratic tradition to build on in West Germany, its 
leaders actively sought to learn from lessons from the past, 
both its successes and failures.  The political tradition of 
authoritarianism survived in a new form, now limited by the 
rule of law.  The State, as in earlier times, was viewed by 
the Germans as a higher entity, but now it represented the 
common interests of the people rather than those of the 
political elite.86 
Both East and West Germany struggled with problems of 
identity and legitimacy since neither state had sole claim 
to the German nation.  East Germany may initially have had 
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the greater claim to legitimacy since capitalism and 
democracy had led to Hitler and the communists had fought 
the Nazis.  But any claim to legitimacy was lost as the East 
Germans voted with their feet and emigrated to the west in 
large numbers.  In order to stem the flow of people, the GDR 
felt compelled to build the Berlin Wall in 1961, turning 
East Germany into a garrison state.87 The most critical 
problem the GDR had was instilling an enduring sense of 
national identity in its own population.88 The communist 
identity that the Soviets hoped to build was instilled more 
by the presence of the Red Army than by ideological 
convictions.89  Public opinion played a large role in the 
GDR as the East German leaders contended with dissidents, 
peace activists, protesters, and citizens who had emotional 
ties to West Germany.90 Along with emotional and historic 
ties to the west the GDR had economic ties necessary for its 
own recovery but these were balanced by political ties with 
the USSR.  There was the constant fear that the Soviet Union 
would bargain away the GDR to the west in return for 
military or economic concessions.  The East German state was 
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dependent upon the continuation of the Cold War.  The GDR 
set out to become the model communist state and build an 
economy that the Soviets would depend on, much as West 
Germany strove to become a model democracy.  But in dealing 
with the west, the GDR's only effective tool was the control 
over its fortified borders.91  The GDR's obdurate policies 
toward the west and assertiveness in Marxist doctrine 
eventually came into conflict with Moscow.92 The Soviet 
Union had slowly come around to the idea that there must be 
a dialogue between east and west even though the ideological 
conflict between socialism and capitalism remained the axis 
around which international political activity ultimately 
revolved.93 
Leaders in the west had come to the same realization. 
During the first two decades of the Cold War West Germany 
had adhered to its policy of Westpolitik and had become 
fully integrated with the west but remained essentially 
isolated from the east—particularly evident in the 
political estrangement from East Germany.  German foreign 
policy was very much constrained by the bipolar 
confrontation, the division of Germany, and the iron rule of 
Konrad Adenauer.  It wasn't until after Adenauer stepped 
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down in 1963 that relations between the two Germanys took 
steps toward normalization.  As the years had passed 
reunification seemed an ever more unattainable goal.  Each 
side became so successful in identifying with their bloc 
that their sense of a collective German identity had become 
obscured.94 To many Germans reunification had lost its 
primacy and urgency as a goal.  The Berlin Wall was a symbol 
of the seemingly permanent division of Germany and Europe. 
But the building of the Wall also represented the failure of 
the "policy of strength" and opened up the possibility for 
new ideas.  As a new generation came of age, one without 
experience of war and unity, they began to question the 
stringent policies and values of the post-war government and 
seek new solutions. 
C.  DETENTE AND OSTPOLITIK 
Ludwig Erhard (CDU) had the difficult job of following 
in Adenauer's footsteps.  Although he looked to provide 
continuity in government, his policies toward East Germany 
began to soften.  West Berliners were allowed to visit 
relatives in East Berlin during the holidays and trade with 
eastern Europe was increased.  But diplomatic relations with 
East Germany and countries that recognized the GDR remained 
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nonexistent.  In 1966, Erhard was replaced by Kurt George 
Kiesinger (CDU).  His foreign minister was Willy Brandt 
(SPD), who saw detente with eastern bloc countries as 
preferable to diplomatic exclusion.  Brandt began to 
establish diplomatic relations with the GDR and those 
countries that recognized it, at first primarily to 
facilitate humanitarian contacts but then economically and 
politically also.  It was hoped that detente would instill a 
measure of confidence in the east that would promote 
security, ease the Cold War tensions, and allow 
normalization of relations with East Germany, objectives 
that had not come about under Adenauer's "policy of 
strength."95 
NATO had adopted a policy of detente as a means to 
reduce tensions in the Harmel Report in December 1967.  The 
western powers had begun to accept the status quo in Europe, 
including the division of Germany.  But for the FRG, 
reunification based on free determination was still the 
ultimate goal.  By permitting closer contacts on both sides 
of the border, the spirit of unity could be kept alive.96 
When Brandt became Chancellor in 1969, he developed a policy 
of Ostpolitik, not as a repudiation of Adenauer's 
95
 Young,   Cold War Europe,   1945-1989:  A Political  History,   p.   68. 
96
 Fritsch-Bournazel,   Confronting  the German Question,   Germans  on  the 
East-West Divide,   pp.   34-35. 
59 
Westpolitik but as an enhancement for German foreign policy 
and security.  Brandt envisioned Germany as a bridge between 
east and west.97 A series of treaties between 1970 and 1973 
opened up relations between West Germany and eastern Europe, 
particularly East Germany.98  Brandt's Ostpolitik proclaimed 
that there were "two German states in one German nation."99 
It was hoped that detente between the two German states 
would serve to liberalize the East German regime.  But not 
all Germans shared Brandt's vision and optimism.  Some saw 
Ostpolitik as limiting German self-determination that would 
hinder reunification efforts.100 
By the late 1970s detente was deemed a failure, 
highlighted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
renewed repression in Poland.  Although detente had opened 
dialogue between the two blocs, the security situation in 
some ways was worse, particularly for the west.  The Soviet 
military had gained numerical superiority in the 1970s which 
sparked an arms race for mutual deterrence.  In the west, 
there was questioning of the American ability and resolve no 
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defend Europe.101 Although West Germany remained pro- 
Atlantic and pro-American, its leaders began to display more 
independence in foreign policy and more willingness to 
disagree with the United States over such issues as an 
agreement with Russia to build a gas pipeline and INF.  At 
the same time, they were strengthening their ties with the 
European community, particularly France.102 
The GDR had its own problems with detente.  East 
Germany was much more isolated than West Germany and its 
actions were more constrained by the Soviet Union.  Moscow 
was willing to ease political, military, and economic 
tensions provided that detente was a substitute, not a 
prelude to German unity.103  But to the East German leaders 
detente presented a threat to the GDR's sovereignty, 
undermined its indispensability to the Soviet Union, and 
eroded popular support of the East German communist party.104 
When Erich Honecker assumed leadership of the GDR he 
emphasized the existence of two German nations with East 
Germany as a separate socialist culture, in contrast to 
Brandt's vision.  Reunification was no longer a goal in the 
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east.103  He encouraged economic accords and gestures of good 
will but he demonstrated more foreign policy independence 
than Moscow was willing to tolerate.  To counter his actions 
the Soviet media launched a propaganda attack against West 
German revanchism.106 
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, Honecker 
initially welcomed his reform programs.  But Honecker and 
other communist leaders soon became concerned that Gorbachev 
was weakening the ideological dividing line between 
socialism and capitalism.  Such a weakening threatened the 
raison  d'etre  and existence of the GDR.107  But Gorbachev had 
come to the realization that communism had ultimately failed 
in the political, economic, and military spheres.  The 
people had been alienated from their rulers by the neo- 
Stalinist system imposed on them by Moscow.  Economically, 
the centralized planning system had failed to keep pace with 
the west or even to provide basic living standards.  Most 
significantly, the military build-up of the Cold War had 
failed to give the Warsaw Pact a decisive advantage and most 
likely contributed to the continued unity of NATO and the 
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isolation of the Soviet Union.108 Gorbachev introduced "new 
thinking" to the ideological confrontation.  He saw a 
growing need for cooperation and interdependence between 
socialism and capitalism; the distance between the two need 
not be so great that it could not be bridged.109 He planned 
a program of democratization from above in order to reform 
communist governments not only in the Soviet Union but in 
Eastern Europe as well.  But once reforms were begun there 
were demands for even greater political change and faster 
economic progress.110  It became evident that if popular 
opinion were given free rein, the Soviet system would 
completely disappear. 
Once the process of democratization and liberalization 
had begun the forces of nationalism were not far behind. 
Many of the national minorities began to demand more 
autonomy or outright independence.  When Gorbachev refused 
to back the communist regimes with the Soviet military, mass 
politics took over.  The first, and most symbolic, communist 
regime to fall was that of East Germany.  A mass movement 
developed for reform and power shifted into the hands of the 
population.111  East Germans demanded their freedom.  The 
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Berlin Wall came down in 1989 because it could no longer 
stem the tide of nationalism and freedom. 
German unity was a far different issue in 198 9 than it 
had been in 1871 or in 1945.  For over four decades each 
side of Germany had adopted radically different and at times 
confrontational identities.  Neither could claim to be the 
embodiment of the true German identity.  Their identity as 
well as security had been a product of the Cold War division 
of Europe.  With the end of the Cold War and the physical 
reunification of Germany, renewed questions of a common 
German identity began to emerge. 
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IV.  THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY 
The end of the Cold War means that the bipolar system 
that kept the peace in Europe for nearly five decades is 
defunct, and in need of replacement.  International politics 
is faced with a period of transition and uncertainty. 
Nationalism has reemerged across Europe and in the areas 
where communism had suppressed the freedom to worship 
organized religion has reemerged as a unifying force.  Both 
of these forces have created conflicts since the end of the 
Cold War.  Popular support and ideas of legitimacy have 
gained new importance but what forms these will assume in 
eastern European countries is as yet unknown.  We have 
already seen the return of former communists and the 
election of neo-fascists to governments.  The end of the 
Cold War has created a sense of ambiguity in world politics 
as countries seek to redefine themselves and their place in 
the new world as questions of national identity and security 
have reemerged.  These questions take on an added 
significance in the case of Germany.  Because of its past, 
German actions are carefully scrutinized for signs of 
resurgent German aggression.  German leaders are sensitive 
to these concerns and have made every effort to demonstrate 
that reunited Germany is a very different country from one 
that wreaked havoc across Europe twice in this century. 
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A.  THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
The reunification of Germany in 1990 was one of the 
most momentous events to mark the end of the Cold War.  For 
the first time in nearly 50 years Germany was once again a 
unified nation with true sovereignty over its domestic and 
foreign affairs.  This milestone was accomplished with the 
approval of all of its neighbors, although not without some 
degree of skepticism and trepidation on the part of some of 
them.  The Final Settlement with respect to Germany was 
accomplished by the Two Plus Four Treaty between the two 
Germanys, plus the United States, France, Great Britain, and 
the Soviet Union.  In addition, there were numerous 
bilateral consultations and agreements that are likely to 
prove important to the future security of Germany and 
Europe.  One of the most significant was the agreement 
concluded by Germany and the Soviet Union in July 1990, 
which stipulated that Germany would be free to choose its 
alliances, that Soviet troops would withdraw from German 
soil by the end of 1994, and the peacetime strength of the 
German armed forces would be reduced to a maximum of 370,000 
troops.  Germany has also reaffirmed that it will not wage 
any war of aggression and that it will renounce the 
manufacture, possession of, and control over nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons.112  In historic terms 
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reunification  has   created a  unique  security  situation. 
Germany,   for  the   first   time,   is  no  longer  a potential  battle 
zone,113 but  a democratic  state  surrounded entirely by other 
democracies  which  it  views  unambiguously as   friends,   and 
partners.114    Never before  has  Germany's  strategic  situation 
been  as   favorable  as   it   is  today.115 
With  the  attainment  of  complete,   national   sovereignty, 
the  German  government  has  had to  reconsider  its   foreign 
policy and  security posture.     Upon  reunification,   Chancellor 
Kohl   clearly   laid  out  Germany's   goals   for  the   future.      In  a 
letter to  the  heads  of  all  the  governments  with which 
Germany  had  diplomatic   relations,   he  declared  that: 
Through  its  regained national  unity,   our  country 
wants  to  serve  the  cause  of global  peace  and 
advance  the  unification  of Europe.     That   is  the 
mandate  of  our  time-honoured  constitution,   the 
basic  law,   which will  also  apply to  the  united 
Germany. 
At  the  same  time,   we  stand by our moral  and 
legal  obligations   resulting  from German history. 
We   know  that   upon  unification,   we  will   also 
assume  greater  responsibility within  the   community 
of  nations  as  a whole.     Our  foreign policy will 
therefore  remain  geared toward global  partnership, 
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close cooperation and a peaceful reconciliation of 
interests. 
In the future, German soil will be a source 
of peace only.  We are aware that the 
inviolability of the borders and respect for the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of ail 
states in Europe is a precondition for peace.116 
Once reunification was accomplished, however, the 
process of adapting to new international and domestic 
situations was more difficult than anticipated.  Germany 
found itself facing a myriad of questions regarding its role 
in Europe.  Cold War policies were no longer applicable to 
the issues that Germany now confronts. 
B.  GERMAN IDENTITY IN A REUNIFIED GERMANY 
Despite German attempts to assure the international 
community that they will remain a force for peace and 
integration, there are lingering apprehensions about the 
size and strength of reunified Germany.  Many considered the 
division of Germany to be a safeguard against renewed German 
nationalistic aggression.  Some of those doubters are 
Germans themselves.  The Greens fought against reunification 
as a "danger for Europe," and Gunter Grass, a noted German 
writer and intellectual, spoke of the dangers in Germany's 
history.117  Foreign Minister Kinkel has acknowledged that 
Excerpt from a letter from Chancellor Kohl to heads of state on 3 
October 1990, as quoted in Germany and Europe  in   Transition,   Adam Daniel 
Rotfeld and Walther Stutzle, eds., Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 
187. 
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because of Germany's past, it's actions are scrutinized more 
closely than other countries, and the Germans are sensitive 
to that.118  Behind the scrutiny seems to be the fear that 
deep-down the Germans remain the same militaristic and 
aggressive people who cannot be trusted with unity, 
sovereignty, or power. 
In 1989, as the drive toward unity gained momentum, the 
rallying cry was "Wir sind ein Volk."  But once 
reunification was underway it became apparent that east and 
west Germans had little in common.  The Germans are not only 
not the same people that they were at the start of the 
century, they do not yet have a common identity amongst 
themselves.  Reunification brought together two very 
different people, not just with different forms of 
governments, but also divergent histories, values, and 
attitudes.  World War II had discredited old ideas of German 
nationalism and identity.  The division of Germany during 
the Cold War caused problems of legitimacy for both East and 
West Germany that were partially resolved by recreating 
political, economic, and cultural identities in each state 
based on socialist-communist and democratic principles 
respectively.  But by doing so they also created divergent 
H' Brunssen, Frank, "Angst  vor Deutschland  and German Self- 
Definition," Debatte,   No. 1/1994, p. 54. 
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histories during the Cold War for the Germans.  The Germans 
must come to a common understanding of their past in order 
to redefine a common identity.  A "new" German identity nas 
not yet been forged, nor has their "old" identity emerged. 
The process of arriving at a common identity will take time 
and patience. 
Yet many Germans are uncomfortable with the idea of 
creating an identity, equating it with the rise of 
nationalism.  Heiner Geissler, the acting chairman of the 
CDU cautioned Germans about renewed "thinking in 
nationalistic terms."  Geissler believes that seeking a 
German identity is unnecessary and perhaps dangerous because 
the concept of nationalism has been discredited.  He says 
that, "Germany's future is not in the reestablishment of a 
national state, but in opening up to other ideas, and in the 
creation of a federal European structure."119 
Chancellor Kohl agrees with Geissler's assessment of 
the importance of European integration but he sees the 
necessity of a common German identity.  In an address to the 
Bundestag, he stressed that "European unity is the most 
effective insurance against the reemergence of nationalism, 
chauvinism and racism."  But he acknowledges the importance 
of maintaining unique identities when he said, "We want 
119
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unity with diversity.  We do not want a centralized European 
state that makes regional, national, cultural traditions, 
and historic experiences disappear.  In a unified Europe. . 
.we will remain Germans and French, keeping our identity."120 
Kohl is attempting to channel emerging German identity along 
constructive paths.  He has called on Germans to engage in 
"active patriotism" and addresses those who fear such 
sentiments, "Let us also resist the temptation to despise 
patriotism just because this virtue got a bad reputation 
during the Nazi period and was abused at the. time."  He 
links his concept of German patriotism with the broader 
German interests, "Just as freedom and love for one's 
fatherland belong together, in the future patriotism and 
commitment to Europe must supplement each other."  He is 
also careful to stress that "anyone who fans hatred against 
foreigners can never claim to be a good patriot."121  While 
talk of German patriotism may raise some apprehensions, his 
attempts to channel those feelings could prevent that gap 
being filled by the rhetoric of radical extremist groups. 
One aspect of reunited Germany that has giving credence 
to the skeptics is the undeniable rise in extremist 
120
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incidents in Germany.  These have been on the rise not only 
in Germany but throughout Europe and even in the United 
States.  In view of Germany's past, however, German 
instances of violence are viewed more critically and 
frequently compared to the racist activities that took place 
in the 1930s heralding Hitler's rise to power.  But there 
are several important differences between today's activities 
and those of the turbulent 1930s.  Germany now has a well 
established democratic tradition and political leaders 
committed to its continuance.  These acts of violence are 
also carried out by a very small minority, while a far 
greater number of Germans have actively condemned these 
acts.  The will of the people now fall in the center rather 
than at the political extremes.  Another important 
difference was the presence of a large revisionist army in 
the 1930s that no longer exists today.122  It has been 
suggested that these acts of violence are not so much an 
indicator of resurgent German aggression as a result of the 
social and economic upheaval created by reunification and 
the end of the Cold War.123  This would also explain the rise 
in extremist activities in other parts of Europe and the 
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fact that incidents of violence in Germany decreased by one 
third during the first half of 1994.124 This decrease also 
reflects the public outcry against these actions and the 
government's concern and willingness to take action. 
Racial violence, however, is also a reflection of a 
growing contradiction in German laws designed for Cold War 
politics.  German citizenship laws, based on ethnic origin, 
were intended to include Germans that were cut off from West 
Germany by Cold War borders.  This meant that anyone with 
German blood ties was automatically a German citizen. 
Germany's liberal asylum laws encouraged refugees to seek 
shelter there, but their citizenship requirements excluded 
most foreigners.  During the years of economic expansion in 
the 1950s and 1960s migrant workers filled gaps in German 
labor demands but they were less welcome after the economic 
slow down of the 1970s, even ones that had been born and 
raised in Germany.  But because of the restrictive 
citizenship laws, they had little legal status in Germany 
and became easy targets for extremist groups.125  Although 
changes to both the asylum laws and the citizenship laws 
have been proposed, real change requires that German 
thinking be revised more in keeping with its integrationist 
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policies.  As Mary Fulbrook aptly commented, "New Germany 
may have to redefine its concept of national identity and 
free itself from the centuries-old concept of ethnically 
homogeneous, if regionally differentiated, German 
Kulturnation. "126 
In redefining a common German identity, Germany can not 
rely solely on either its distant or near past but on the 
future.  The Germany that is seeking an identity for the 
twenty-first century is vastly different from the country 
created in 1871.  Both Europe's and Germany's place in the 
world are far different.  Germany's present unity was 
attained not through war and by antagonizing its neighbors 
but through peaceful negotiation.  Germany today is firmly 
entrenched in democratic tradition and popular sovereignty. 
And democracies are capable of assimilating different ideas 
and values and allowing a variety of identities to coexist 
side by side.  Germany has firmly rejected the idea of 
Sonderweg, a special mission for Germany, and is now 
focusing its political energies on furthering European 
integration. 
C.  THE OUT-OF-AREA ISSUE 
One of the most significant issues faced by reunified 
Germany is the question of the role of the Bundeswehr in 
126
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out-of-area operation.  This issue received international 
attention before Germany was prepared to deal with it. 
During the final stages of the two-plus-four treaty 
negotiations Iraq invaded Kuwait, creating an international 
crisis and a dilemma for Germany. 
Initial German concerns centered on whether the crisis 
would disrupt the reunification negotiations or cause the 
Soviet Union to change its position regarding its military 
withdrawal from eastern Germany. 
Although neither of these fears proved warranted, 
German foreign affairs remained constrained by the 
reunification process and the nature of their democracy. 
Until all the parties had ratified the treaties and Soviet 
troops had departed German soil, Germany remained careful 
not to create animosity that could undermine its efforts. 
Additionally, unification itself absorbed much of Germany's 
energies, and certainly its budget, since the process was 
both more difficult and more expensive than anticipated. 
Through the Gulf crisis, German security concerns were 
focused primarily on the changes occurring within its own 
borders, in central Europe, and in the Soviet Union. 
Germany's allies, on the other hand, expected greater 
participation in the Iraq crisis, which was viewed as an 
exemplar for post-Cold War conflict.  But Germany remained 
reluctant to commit its troops to a conflict outside the 
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NATO  area.     Instead  it  provided  substantial   financial 
support  to  the  coalition  efforts   in  order  to  fulfill   its 
international   obligations  while  upholding   the   letter  of   its 
fundamental   law.      Despite   its   obvious   distractions   during 
the   Iraq  conflict,   and   its   efforts   to   contribute  within 
self-imposed  limits,   Germany was  harshly  criticized by  the 
international  community  for  its   restraint  during  the  Gulf 
War.     This   forced  consideration  of  the   issue  of Germany's 
future  international   role  and  the  use  of  its  military  in 
wider  roles  at  the  very onset  of  reunification.127 
The  Germans'   self-imposed  restraint   on   the  use  of  their 
military  reflects   their  reservations   about   the   use   of 
military  force  since  the  end of World War  II.128    The 
controversy began  with  the  question   of  whether  Germany 
should be  rearmed  at  all.     The  debate  was  both  international 
and domestic.     Allied  restrictions  on West  German  rearmament 
were  not   loosened  until  the  Korean  War  forced  the  issue  of 
western defense.     German participation was  deemed  necessary 
by most  of  the  western  allies  although  there were  serious 
reservations,   particularly  from France.129    There  was  also 
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significant internal debate on the issue since many Germans 
felt that they should renounce weapons forever.130 
Militarism and the use of military power had been thoroughly 
discredited by Germany's experiences and devastating defeats 
in the two world wars.  But despite public reticence, German 
leaders believed that the utility of rearmament outweighed 
the risks.  Rearmament was necessary for more complete 
integration with the West, to support Adenauer's policy of 
strength, and later to provide stability for detente.  It 
was feared that neutrality could make Germany vulnerable to 
the Soviet Union by isolating it from the West.131 
Once the decision to rearm was made, the Germans kept 
their military role low-key by limiting the use of their 
armed forces to defense of their own territory.  They were 
sensitive to their role in history and had strong 
reservations regarding the appearance of aggressively armed 
German troops.  These reservations precluded the use of 
German troops in all of Europe as well as much of northern 
Africa and southeast Asia.  Also, with Germany at the center 
of the bipolar conflict, it was the most likely site of a 
potential battlefield.  With German troops at the vanguard 
129
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of the central front it seemed inappropriate to expect 
German participation in other engagements.  Any escalation 
of Cold War tensions would have resulted in Germans fighting 
other Germans.132 Germany's caution and circumspection 
regarding their use of military force during the Cold War 
created deep-rooted habit of restraint that had been 
accepted by both the German public and the international 
community. 
The end of the Cold War has now eliminated much of the 
rationale for not engaging in out-of-area ooerations.  There 
is no longer the possibility of West Germans facing East 
Germans on the battlefield.  Memories of aggressive German 
military action have faded since Germany has proven itself 
to be a reliable ally.  In addition, with the restraints on 
German actions removed, Germany's allies have voiced their 
expectation that Germany assume more responsibilities 
towards world peace within the membership of international 
institutions, including greater participation in out-of-area 
operations.  Nevertheless, even as the Germans have 
cautiously begun to expand their military participation 
beyond strict self-defense, every action has engendered 
debate within Germany. 
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Up until July 1994, their reluctance to use the German 
armed forces for purposes outside of national or NATO 
defense had been supported by a narrow interpretation of the 
constitution.'33  The debate primarily revolved around two 
articles of the Basic Law.  Article 24 states that: 
For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may 
enter a system of mutual collective security; in 
doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon 
its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and 
secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and 
among the nations of the world. 
But Article 87a specified that: 
The Federation shall establish armed forces for 
defence purposes," and "Apart from defence, the 
Armed Forces may only be used insofar as 
explicitly permitted by this Basic Law. 
It has become accepted to interpret the Basic Law by the 
narrowest definition of "defensive purposes" as allowing 
only protection against the attack of national borders. 
It is interesting to note that Article 24 was a part of 
the original Basic Law which was adopted by the West German 
government in May 1949, only a month after the North 
Atlantic Treaty was signed.  However, West Germany did not 
regain its sovereignty until it was permitted to join NATO 
and raise an armed forces as a NATO contingent in 1955.134 
Article 87a was not added until March 1956, after the 
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process of German rearmament had begun.  At no time has 
Germany specifically requested special consideration 
regarding its obligations in any international organization. 
Germany became a member of the United Nations in 1973, 
without qualifications to its obligations.'-15  In addition to 
NATO and the UN, Germany is also involved in the Western 
European Union (WEU) and the Conference on Security and 
cooperation in Europe (CSCE), both of which entail 
significant security obligations. 
Germany's membership in international organization has 
contributed substantially to German security and stability. 
Continuing involvement with those organizations will be no 
less important in the future.  With Germany's economic 
strength and central position in Europe, it will have a 
vested interest in achieving and maintaining global 
stability.  Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has also suggested 
that "Not the least because of our historical past, Germany 
is morally obliged to participate in defending peace. 
Without the readiness to do so, Germany would be unable to 
be in the alliance and to act.  Our vital interests as an 
economic, trade, and cultural nation in the world would also 
be hurt."136 
Kamp, "The German Bundeswehr in out-of-area operation:  to enqage 
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Chancellor Kohl agrees that Germany must now be willing 
to shoulder more equitable responsibility for the global 
stability that it depends on: 
Our security and negotiating ability in foreign 
policy matters is geared to the fact that we are 
reliable partners and that our allies trust us. 
After all, our allies stood by us in the past, and 
continue to do so.  When it come to peace and 
freedom in Europe and the world, Germany must not 
stand on the sidelines.  We must share the 
responsibility at the side of our friends and 
partners.  The Bundeswehr 's involvement in 
measures to safeguard world peace within the 
community of nations is not only a central issue 
of German foreign and security policy, but also a 
question of German honor and identity.137 
In this light, for Kohl, "the issue of the Bundeswehr's 
deployment is a the heart of united Germany's future 
alliance and partnership capability."138 
Although the narrowest interpretation of the Basic Law 
has been accepted more or less since its inception, a debate 
over the validity of that interpretation has gained momentum 
in recent years.  The chancellor's party and its southern 
counterpart, the CDU/CSU (Christian Democrat and Christian 
Social Unions), have taken the position that the Basic Law, 
as written, allowed for German participation in both 
136
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peacekeeping and peacemaking operations including combat 
roles when necessary but only when conducted with other 
countries under the auspices of international law.  The Free 
Democrats (FDP), a part of the government coalition, believe 
that a change in current policy would necessitate a change 
to the Basic Law, but once that change was made combat 
operations would be feasible for the Bundeswehr.  The 
opposition party, the Social Democrats (SDP) have proposed a 
change to the Basic Law that would permit German 
participation in out-of-area missions but only UN 
peacekeeping missions not involving a combat role.  The 
Greens have been divided on the issue, with some rejecting 
the use of the military for any purpose outside of 
territorial defense while others argue for the use of force 
to defend humanitarian measures as in cases like Bosnia.139 
The political deadlock on the out-of-area issue 
continues despite government initiatives to widen the 
participation of the Bundeswehr in UN missions.  Although 
German participation was limited during the Gulf War, since 
then they have begun to respond to international pressure to 
participate more fully in UN missions abroad.  The German 
Navy took part in mineclearing operations in the Gulf War, 
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whereas similar requests for German assistance had been 
rejected as recently as 1988.  German helicopters 
participated in support mission for Kurdish refugees in 
Turkey and Iran.   The German Air Force has also 
participated in UN observer missions over Iraq to monitor 
the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.  In 1992 the 
Bundeswehr provided medical support for UN troops in 
Cambodia, and committed forces to patrol duty in the 
Adriatic, for food airlifts to Somalia, and to NATO AWACS 
airplanes patrolling air space in Bosnia.  In 1993 Germany 
took part in UNOSOM II in Somalia, providing logistical 
support for the UN.  Although German participation in these 
efforts have been small and have avoided any combat related 
missions, it represents a move toward greater participation. 
Yet even these limited efforts have been criticized by 
government opponents as going beyond the legal 
constitutional limits.  Following the decision to take part 
in the operation in the Adriatic, the SPD appealed to the 
Constitutional Court for a ruling on the legality of German 
participation. 14° 
On 12 July 1994, the Constitutional Court cleared the 
way for greater German participation in multilateral 
operations by ruling that the Basic Law allowed such 
140
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missions.  However the Court ruled that the government must 
receive Bundestag approval by a simple majority prior to 
each deployment of German armed forces.141 
Although the court ruling now allows Germany to 
participate in out-of-area operations, the issue is not yet 
settled.  While the court's decision will eliminate the 
legal objections to sending troops abroad, some political 
obstacles remain.  The CDU/CSU government plans to draft an 
armed forces deployment law that will provide criteria for 
the use of the German military and government and 
parliamentary responsibilities in the event of the necessity 
for deployment.142 A true test of Germany's resolve and 
willingness to participate has not yet occurred.  Since any 
deployment must be approved by the Bundestag, political 
wrangling could effectively prevent deployments.  Also, 
public consensus and approval have yet to be achieved.  Many 
Germans remain wary of sending German troops to foreign soil 
particularly where Germans took aggressive action in the 
past.143 At the same time, public opinion has increasingly 
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supported German participation in UN peacekeeping and 
peacemaking operations.  However, the public must be fully 
apprised of the necessity for new roles for the 
Bundeswehr.144  Lastly, the German military will require 
organizational restructuring to meet new requirements.  Some 
steps have already been taken in this regard.  The White 
Paper, released in April 1994, was already geared toward the 
expectation of an enlarged German role in future 
multinational operations in order to assume its 
international responsibilities.145 
D.  IMPLICATIONS FOR GERMAN SECURITY 
The Constitutional Court ruling has opened the way for 
Germany to at last become a normal country, in that it now 
has the same choices to make regarding its international 
responsibilities as do its obvious peers within the 
international community.  But the freedom to act does not 
mean that Germany must necessarily participate in every 
operation.  Like its international partners, Germany must 
consider what interests will best be served by their 
involvement. 
144
 Kamp, "The German Bundeswehr in out-of-area operation:  to engage 
or not to engage?," p. 168. 
145
 White Paper 1994, p. 43, para. 319. 
85 
Although the Court ruling was a significant victory for 
Chancellor Kohl, his government has been careful to 
emphasize that Germany's long-standing policy of restraint 
will be continued.  Foreign Minister Kinkel has said that 
"militarization of foreign policy and interventionism is out 
of the question."  Germany remains committed to a "value- 
oriented foreign policy."  Each action will be carefully 
considered on its own merits.  Germany will participate only 
under the auspices of a UN Security Council mandate and will 
never take action on its own.  However, there will be no 
automatic German commitment to multilateral actions; he 
expects that Germany will say "no" more than "yes."  Even 
under a UN mandate, the use of force must be the last 
resort.146  Kinkel also stresses that the ruling will enhance 
European solidarity: 
The European aspect of the ruling. . .is no less 
significant.  A serious obstacle to our ability to 
act as a reliable partner within the alliance, in 
the EU, and in the WEU has been removed, and the 
path for the development of a European foreign, 
security, and defense policy has been cleared. 
. The Federal Government emphatically supports a 
common European foreign and security policy.  It 
is an indispensable element of a free and 
efficient EU, and a precautionary measure against 
nationalism and ethnic and religious disputes.147 
Gennrich, Claus, "Kinkel—Now We Are Free, If the Security 
Council Agrees," Main Frankfurter Allgemeine,   14 July 1994, o  3  FBIS- 
WEU-94-136, 14 July 1994. 
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The focus of German security policy is on cooperative 
efforts within its alliances and multinational institutions. 
According to the 1994 White Paper "the Bundeswehr  is an 
alliance Army."148  Germany has repeatedly emphasized that 
it will not act on its own but only with allies and 
partners.  Because of Germany's history as an aggressor 
nation and the renewed sensitivities of its neighbors 
following unification, Germany has committed to scrupulous 
multinationality in its military activities.  But Germany 
would like to see its roles within NATO, WEU, CSCE, and the 
UN with regard to peace operations as primarily political 
and economic, not military.149 
The NATO alliance is still considered by Germany to be 
the best means of coordinating Western policy aimed at 
building a common security in Europe.  NATO provides the 
framework for incorporating German military might and for 
maintaining a US military presence in Europe.150 NATO's 
primary role is still to maintain a lasting peace in Europe 
in conjunction with other institutions.  The January 1994 
NATO summit in Brussels explicitly reaffirmed that the 
147
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ability to exercise collective defense remains the 
cornerstone of European security.  Although it is unlikely 
that NATO will be required to defend itself, the numerous 
conflicts on alliance borders require NATO participation in 
the international resolution of crises.  NATO reform and 
European integration have become more closely linked to one 
another and the WEU will be strengthened as the European 
pillar of the Alliance.151 
German security will remain an issue of prime concern 
for Germany in the post-Cold War era.  During the Cold War 
Germany found that it's security was best assured by 
integration with the West and membership in multinational 
institutions.  Since the reunification, Germany has been the 
staunchest advocate of further expansion of the institutions 
that played such a vital role in the peace that Europe has 
enjoyed since the end of World War II. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Germany's history as a nation, in many respects, is the 
history of Europe.  This reflects not so much its 
geographical position, although that too is relevant, but 
the central position in the European system of states that 
Germany assumed upon unification in 1871.  Because of its 
size and economic potential, it was inevitable that Germany 
become a major player in European affairs.  German 
unification disrupted the balance of power in Europe and 
during the relatively brief 74-year period of unity, Germany 
led Europe through the two world wars in the twentieth 
century.  After the Second World War, Germany once again 
found itself divided.  Despite the tensions of the Cold War, 
Europe has enjoyed five decades of peace.  Some have 
attributed that peace to the division of Germany which they 
believe contained its powers and aggressive tendencies.  The 
reunification of Germany has raised renewed questions 
regarding German national identity and national security. 
These concerns reflect the fear that German unity will once 
again become a threat to the rest of Europe and result in 
the disruption of peace.  In some ways the reunification of 
Germany faintly echoes the creation of the German state in 
1871.  A large powerful country was formed in a short period 
of time by combining disparate German states.  Reunification 
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of Germany has also marked the end of the bipolar system of 
states that dominated international affairs during the Cold 
War, creating a certain amount of ambiguity in foreign 
relations.  But despite the vague similarities, the 
situation is vastly different today.  Germany is a very 
different country and, just as important, Europe presents a 
quite different environment.  Because of these difference, 
Germany is unlikely to revert to nationalistic aggressive 
behavior that the skeptics seem to fear. 
German ideas of national identity have also changed. 
The anti-foreign and protectionist features of the national 
identity that formed after 1871 was overtaken by the 
ideological confrontation of the Cold War.  Since 
reunification there has been renewed interest in a common 
German identity, but the idea of nationalism and national 
interests still make many Germans very uncomfortable. 
Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War and the 
reunification of Germany, there has been a reemergence of 
national interests.  However, those interests revolve around 
the integration of Europe and Germany's multinational 
responsibilities.  The rise of nationalism has been more 
prevalent elsewhere in Europe, primarily in the newly 
liberated eastern European countries but also in Italy and 
Belgium where neo-fascist parties have made gains in recent 
elections.  Even the initial spate of extremist violence 
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that marked the beginning of the reunification process and 
caused so much concern has abated considerably.  The 
majority of the German people are politically central with 
only a very small minority on the extremist fringes.  A 
common German identity has not yet fully emerged but Germany 
remains focused on liberal-democratic ideals and European 
integration.  Ideas of identity do not revolve around the 
supremacy of das   Volk  but rather Germany's place in Europe. 
Concerns about German identity revolve to a large 
degree around foreign policy issues.  German interaction 
with the countries around them reflect their perception of 
how to protect their security.  German aggression is not an 
ingrained trait but was a reaction to the European security 
problems of the past.  The German state was created in 1871 
in order to resolve their security dilemma of the early 
nineteenth century.  The fragmented German states were 
threatened primarily by the powerful French nation to the 
west but also by the Russians to the east.  German identity 
therefore coalesced around anti-foreign sentiments and the 
belief that Germans must unite to create a bulwark against 
threats from all sides.  German unity was achieved largely 
through a series of successful wars that sparked a national 
cohesion and an exaggerated sense of pride.  The 
reunification of 1990, however, was conducted peacefully, 
entirely through negotiation with the concurrence of all its 
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neighbors.  Instead of antagonistic anti-foreign overtones, 
reunification was conducted under the banner of further 
European unity and integration. 
German engagement in Europe has been the one solution 
to German security problems that has proven to support 
lasting peace.  Skeptics of German unity often forget that 
Europe enjoyed over four decades of peace after the founding 
of the Second Reich.  Bismarck had anticipated the 
disruptive consequences of German unity of the European 
system of states and sought to avoid the problems of being 
encircled by enemies.  His solution to Germany's precarious 
security situation was to create a system of alliances that 
would tie Germany to the other powers in order to make an 
anti-German war unlikely.  Although there were inherent 
problems in the complex network of secret agreements which 
carried few guarantees, it nevertheless accomplished 
Bismarck's objectives.  It was only after Bismarck's forced 
retirement that these agreements were allowed to lapse and 
Germany found itself more isolated.  Kaiser Wilhelm II's 
aggressive tactics to boost Germany from a continental power 
to a world power exacerbated the situation which culminated 
in World War I.  After the war Germany's political and 
economic isolation imposed by the terms of the Versailles 
Treaty was a chief contributor to the collapse of the 
fledgling Weimar Republic and facilitated Adolf Hitler's 
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emergence as the new German leader under his extremist 
National Socialist Party flag.  Hitler used international 
liberal guilt to further his own ends and generate a policy 
of appeasement among the European states.  He steadfastly 
refused to entangle Germany in European politics.  Hitler's 
policies further isolated Germany and he sought to expand 
the German sphere in order to ensure security.  His efforts 
nearly destroyed Germany.  After World War II, Germany and 
Europe were divided.  During the Cold War, West Germany 
fully integrated with the West, but until the 1970s remained 
aloof from eastern Europe, especially East Germany.  German 
security was guaranteed first and foremost by the Atlantic 
Alliance and the continued presence of the United States in 
Europe but also by Germany's involvement in the European 
Union, the United Nations, CSCE, and WEU.  Germany's network 
of memberships in international institutions is far more 
complex today than in Bismarck's time, but today those 
associations for the most part overlap and reinforce one 
another.  Germany's immediate and long-term goal is to now 
further the integration of Europe in order to extend the 
peace and prosperity that western Europe has achieved. 
Today Germany enjoys the most favorable security 
situation in its history.  Geography has long been an 
important factor in Germany's security dilemmas.  Because of 
its central position, it was vulnerable to encirclement by 
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the French and Russians who had historically used German 
lands to expand their influence and territory.  Germany's 
integration with the West after World War II resolved half 
of this security problem.  Indeed, the reconciliation 
between Germany and France has been one of the outstanding 
achievements of the Federal Republic.  Instead of 
representing the traditional threat from the west, France is 
now one of Germany's staunchest allies.  With the end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the communist governments to 
the east, Germany, for the first time, is surrounded 
entirely by acknowledged friends and democratic states. 
The differences between the Second Reich and the 
unified Federal Republic are not all external in nature. 
Germany's political culture has also altered radically. 
Symbolically, Germany has detached itself from its Prussian 
heritage.  In a literal sense the area that comprised 
Prussia was cut off from Germany after World War II and 
absorbed into Poland and Russia.  Significantly, Germany has 
specifically renounced all claims to that territory.  The 
authoritarianism that was a legacy of Prussia's leading role 
in German unity has also given way to firmly entrenched 
liberal-democratic traditions.  In the past, Germany 
depended on an elitist system of strong leaders that set 
foreign and domestic policies with little input from the 
public.  Today the German constitution sets specific limits 
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on the government's powers and protects the rights of the 
people.  The government is responsive to the public's 
interests through its electoral system, party structure, and 
parliamentary representation.   In addition, the 
constitution carefully circumscribes the establishment and 
use of the military.  The Prussian militaristic traditions 
were thoroughly discredited by the experiences of the two 
world wars and have been replaced by an army of "citizens in 
uniform" with a tradition of military restraint.  During the 
reunification process Germany agreed to reduce its military 
to 370,000 troops and have not only met that goal but have 
cut an additional 30,000.  In addition, Germany has 
unilaterally renounced the use of weapons of mass 
destruction, including nuclear weapons. 
Despite the notion of Sonderweg,   a special path for 
Germany, German history has reflected, and in many cases 
intensified European trends.  Germany was a relative 
latecomer to the unifying forces of nationalism and German 
national unity was achieved with much less bloodshed than 
French attempts at national expansion.  In the years before 
the First World War, German attempts to expand its influence 
and become a world power reflected the policies of the other 
great powers of Europe.  Then after World War I, many 
countries in Europe struggled with forces of extremism 
either on the right or the left.  Germany was not the first 
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fascist country in Europe but followed in Italy's footsteps. 
But whereas the earlier following of European trends 
presented a security threat for Germany's neighbors, since 
World War II Germany has embarked on a program of 
integration with the west under liberal-democratic 
principles that not only ensures its own security but 
enhances the security of the entire continent.  With the end 
of the Cold War, Germany is seeking to expand the success of 
integration and the security that accompanied that policy to 
the east. 
The reunification of Germany and the restoration of 
full sovereignty means that Germany has the opportunity to 
be a "normal" country for the first time since before World 
War I, in that it has the same choices and responsibilities 
of its peers in the international system.  But in order to 
act as a normal country, Germany and the rest of the world 
must finally put the past behind them.  Germany recognizes 
that because of its history its actions will be carefully 
scrutinized, and German policies reflect their sensitivity 
oversensitivity on the part of either Germany or its 
partners to the memories of past German aggression.  But 
oversensitivity on the part of Germany or its partners in 
the international community could undermine its efforts to 
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